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U.S. sanctions against U.S. persons trading with Cuba are not new. What is
new is a U.S. law known as "Helms-Burton," which imposes liabilities and
sanctions against non-U.S. persons trading with Cuba. This U.S. law seeks to
implement U.S. foreign policy by putting such persons' business interests in the
United States at risk and by denying them entry into the United States. The desired
outcome is to inhibit non-U.S. persons from trading with and investing in Cuba.
The international community generally condemns the U.S. approach as con-
trary to customary international and treaty law. A number of countries, including
Canada, implemented blocking laws to counteract the U.S. approach.
After outlining the principal provisions of Helms-Burton, this article discusses
the Canadian legal response and the difficulties Canadian corporations must con-
tend with in applying Canadian law. The article explores numerous practical
problems involving the conflicting U.S. and Canadian laws, and suggests possible
approaches to deal with these problems.
Note: The American Bar Association grants permission to reproduce this article, or a part thereof,
in any not-for-profit publication or handout provided such material acknowledges original publication
in this issue of The International Lawyer and includes the title of the article and the name of the
author.
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Outside the United States" presented by the author at the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation
Special Institute on International Resources Law in Denver, Colorado, on March 3, 1997. The
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I. Helms-Burton
The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act,' commonly
referred to as Helms-Burton after its congressional sponsors, is probably the
most notorious recent U.S. law with extraterritorial implications. 2 Title III of
Helms-Burton, entitled "Protection of Property Rights of United States Nation-
als," creates for U.S. nationals whose property was confiscated by the revolution-
ary Cuban Government a private right to sue in U.S. federal courts foreign
investors trafficking in such property. Although the right to sue is suspended,
the potential for claims continues to sow uncertainty for investors in Cuba.3
In addition to the uncertainty arising from the temporary suspensions, there
is the deliberate uncertainty of Helms-Burton itself. Under Title III of Helms-
Burton, the term "traffic" has an extraordinarily broad definition. Trafficking
includes selling, transferring, distributing, dispensing, brokering, managing, or
otherwise disposing of confiscated property, or purchasing, leasing, receiving,
possessing, obtaining control of, managing, using, or otherwise acquiring or
holding an interest in confiscated property. The term also includes engaging in
any type of commercial activity using, or otherwise benefiting from, confiscated
property, and causing, directing, participating in, or profiting from trafficking by
another person, or through another person .' It should be noted that the definition of
"traffic" requires that the person "knowingly and intentionally" engage in the
prohibited activity. This definition opens the door to defenses based on due
diligence.5 There are very limited exceptions, the most important of which is
the trading or holding of publicly traded securities. 6
1. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-114
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.).
2. Another recent but less well-known U.S. extraterritorial law is the Iran and Libya Sanctions
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172 ("ILSA"). Instead of conferring a private right of action on property
claimants, ILSA requires the president to impose economic sanctions against persons who make invest-
ments in the oil or gas industry in Iran and Libya, or who engage in certain exports to Libya. In compari-
son to Helms-Burton, the activities that trigger sanctions under ILSA are more specific and must be
significant. At the time of writing, Canada has not enacted any blocking legislation directed at ILSA.
This situation may change, as the Canadian firm Bow Valley Energy Ltd. is under investigation because
of its participation in an Iranian energy project. See Gary G. Yerkey, Sanctions: "Sen. D'Amato Con-
siders Tightening Iran-Libya Law by Including Banks, 14 INT'L TRADE REP. No. 44, 1929 (1997).
3. On July 16, 1996, U.S. President Clinton allowed Title III to come into force as of August
1, 1996. However, he continues to postpone the right to sue provisions on a rolling six-month basis.
Under the law, the original date upon which lawsuits could be brought was November 1, 1996. The
three-month interim period was designed to encourage traffickers to cease their trafficking and to
dispose of their assets in Cuba before they become subject to suit. Liability for trafficking started
to accrue from November 1, 1996. See CANADA ENCOURAGED BY U.S. PRESIDENT'S DECISION ON
HELMS-BURTON ACT, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE NEWS RE-
LEASE No. 127, July 16, 1996.
4. Helms-Burton Act § 4(13).
5. See Stephen H. Marcus, The Helms-Burton Act: Navigating the U.S. Legal Environment,
proceedings of a conference entitled After Cuba-U.S. Extraterritorial Restrictions on Canadian
Business organized by the Canadian Institute, Toronto, June 26, 1996, Tab. IV at 4-5. Authorization
of a U.S. national holding a claim to the property also insulates the trafficker from liability.
6. See Helms-Burton Act § 4(13)(B).
VOL. 32, NO. I
CANADA'S FOREIGN EXTRATERRITORIAL MEASURES ACT 95
Thus, the definition of trafficking exposes foreign individuals and companies
to potential liability if they are in virtually any manner commercially linked to
confiscated property. Any assets they possess within the United States are put
at risk. What is even more controversial is that Title III's remedies are dispropor-
tionate to the behavior engaged in by many traffickers. A person anywhere in
the world with a relatively tenuous connection to confiscated property, such as
selling a nominal amount of goods or services to a trafficker, can in theory be
held responsible for compensating a U.S. claimant for the entire value of the
property in issue, plus interest and the costs of litigation.7 If the claimant complies
with a notice provision, a trafficker in property for which a claim has been
certified by the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC) may also
be liable for treble damages.8 The broad definition of traffic and the prospect of
treble damages are clearly intended to encourage lawsuits and to provide foreign
nationals with a tremendous disincentive to continuing their present business
activities in Cuba.
Of additional concern are the provisions of Title IV of Helms-Burton. Title
IV empowers the U.S. Government to restrict entry into the United States for
the senior executives, officers, controlling shareholders, and agents of foreign
companies trafficking in confiscated U.S. property in Cuba. A particularly strik-
ing feature of Title IV is that the restrictions on entry extend to both the spouses
and minor children of these individuals.9
In June 1996 the U.S. State Department published guidelines implementing
Title IV. The guidelines describe in some detail the classes of persons who may
be denied visas and the procedure used in determining whom to exclude.'°
Foreign investors and their governments are encouraged by the fact that, to
date, the U.S Government has enforced Title IV in a restrained manner. At the
time of writing, approximately nineteen executives from only two corporations-
one Mexican (Grupo Domos) and one Canadian (the mining firm Sherritt Interna-
tional Corporation (Sherritt))-were denied entry into the United States."
7. Id. § 302(a)(1)(A).
8. Id. § 302(a)(3). The use of treble damages arose under American antitrust law. Treble
damages are designed both as a penal measure and as a tool to actually encourage lawsuits (essentially
a system of private enforcement). Considering their penal nature, their appropriateness is questioned
by Canada and other nations in the antitrust context. It is also questionable whether they are appropriate
in providing compensation for expropriated property.
9. Id. § 401(a)(3), (4).
10. Guidelines Implementing Title IV of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, 61
Fed. Reg. 30655 (1996).
11. Peter Morton, Helms-Burton Probe Widens Its Net, THE FINANCIAL POST, Oct. 1997, at 5.
The names of the individual executives are technically confidential, but were widely published in
the press. On November 17, 1997, the U.S. State Department announced that officers of BM Group,
an Israeli-owned citrus company, were sent determination letters informing them that their activities
involving confiscated U.S.-claimed properties in Cuba were within the purview of Title IV. Transcript
of State Department News Briefing. According to The Financial Post report, there are dozens of
other companies being investigated under Title IV.
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This article focuses on the issues arising for Canadian corporations under Title
III of Helms-Burton. In view of the similarity of the definition of traffic in Title
IV, some (but not all) of the analysis concerning Title III may be applied to
problems involving Title IV.
II. Canada's Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act
A. BACKGROUND
1. Antitrust Origins
Canada's blocking legislation is encapsulated in the Foreign Extraterritorial
Measures Act 2 (FEMA) and an order issued under FEMA in January 1996."3
FEMA was not enacted to address extraterritorial U.S. law regarding Cuba, but
has since been broadened to do just that.
FEMA was enacted originally to counteract the intrusive discovery procedures
and treble damages judgments associated with private antitrust litigation brought
in the United States. FEMA was based on the U.K.'s Protection of Trading
Interests Act 1980 (PTIA), which was passed for the same reason. A number
of other countries also passed similar legislation around this time. The impetus
for these laws was the uranium cartel antitrust litigation originating in the United
States in the 1970s.
In this litigation, Westinghouse sued Canadian, British, Australian, and French
uranium mining corporations allegedly participating in a worldwide uranium
cartel. Westinghouse sought treble damages under U.S. antitrust law that were
so large they threatened to put the mining companies into bankruptcy. A sensitive
aspect of the case was the allegation that the mining companies' home governments
sanctioned the cartel because the U.S. Government closed the U.S. market to
imports from foreign countries in order to protect U.S. uranium producers.14
The response of the Canadian Government was to pass the Uranium Information
Security Regulations, 5 which prohibited the furnishing of documents or other
information regarding Canadian-produced uranium in response to subpoenas or
other orders by U.S. courts. These regulations did not protect the Canadian
defendants against enforcement in Canada of a U.S. treble damages judgment,
however. FEMA cured this deficiency and also included general provisions re-
garding the turning over of records and information to foreign tribunals. The
specifics of these and other aspects of FEMA are discussed below.
12. R.S.C. ch. F-29 (1985) as amended by Bill C-54, proclaimed in force Jan. 1, 1997.
13. FOREIGN EXTRATERRITORIAL MEASURES (UNITED STATES) ORDER, 1992, as amended, SOR/
96-84, Jan. 15, 1996 (the FEMA Order). The impetus for the FEMA Order almost certainly was
the Helms-Burton bill, but nowhere in the Order is this made explicit.
14. For background, see William C. Graham, The Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, 11
CANADIAN Bus. L. J. 410 (1986).
15. C.R.C., c. 366, revoked by SOR/94-515, July 19, 1994.
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2. U.S. Embargo of Cuba as an Unanticipated Use of FEMA
Ironically, FEMA has yet to be used to blunt the impact of U.S. antitrust
litigation. Rather, FEMA was deployed in a makeshift fashion three times in
relation to U.S. extraterritorial measures regarding Cuba. At the time FEMA
was enacted, it is likely that little thought was given to relying upon it to block
the impact of U.S. extraterritorial laws regarding Cuba. At that time, the U.S.
Cuban embargo law permitted foreign subsidiaries of American parent corpora-
tions to engage in licensed trade with Cuba if the subsidiary generally operated
independently from its parent. 16 Realizing that FEMA required fine-tuning to
deal with Helms-Burton, the Canadian Government quickly amended FEMA in
the fall of 1996, soon after the enactment of Helms-Burton, to explicitly extend
FEMA's application to "foreign trade laws" such as Helms-Burton. 7
B. OVERVIEW OF FEMA
1. Helms-Burton Scheduled as Objectionable Foreign Trade Law
Section 2.1 of FEMA permits the Attorney General and the Minister of Foreign
Affairs to list in a schedule to the legislation foreign trade laws that, in the opinion
of the Attorney General, are contrary to international law or international comity.
The only foreign trade law listed at the time of writing is Helms-Burton. 18 The
focal point of the recent amendments to FEMA is Title III of Helms-Burton. As
becomes apparent in the following discussion, FEMA does not address the denial
of entry provisions of Title IV of Helms-Burton.
2. Restrictions on Production of Documents in Helms-Burton Litigation
FEMA permits the Canadian Government to impose far-reaching restrictions
on any discovery process or giving of evidence involving Canadian defendants in
Helms-Burton litigation. Section 3 of FEMA permits the Attorney General to issue
an order prohibiting or restricting production and disclosure to a foreign tribunal
of documents located in Canada or under the possession or control of a Canadian
citizen or resident. The Attorney General may also issue an order prohibiting or
restricting the giving of evidence by a Canadian citizen or resident. These orders
may be issued when the Attorney General is of the opinion the foreign tribunal is
exercising powers that "adversely affect significant Canadian interests in relation
to international trade or commerce involving a business carried on in whole or in
part in Canada or that otherwise ... infringe Canadian sovereignty, or jurisdiction
or powers . . . related to the enforcement of a foreign trade law."
16. See Extraterritoriality in the 1990s, Investment Canada Working Paper No. 15, n. 58 (1993).
17. See GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCES MEASURES TO OPPOSE U.S. HELMS-BURTON ACT, DEPART-
MENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE NEWS RELEASE No. 115, June 17, 1996.
FEMA amendments received First Reading on September 16, 1996, and were proclaimed in force
on January 1, 1997.
18. Curiously, the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. 515 ("CACR"), are not listed
in the FEMA schedule.
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To date, no order under section 3 has been issued in relation to Helms-Burton
proceedings. If the suspension of lawsuits under Title III of Helms-Burton is
lifted, it can be expected that the Attorney General will issue orders under section
3 of FEMA. If the Attorney General convinces a court that an order under section
3 may not be complied with, the court may issue a warrant under section 4
authorizing seizure of records and delivery of them to the court or a designated
person for safekeeping.
3. Notification and Noncompliance Obligations
The notification and noncompliance obligations of FEMA are central to the
current Canadian response to the extraterritorial application of the Cuban embargo
and Helms-Burton.
Section 5 of FEMA permits the Attorney General and the Minister of Foreign
Affairs to issue orders to block the application of foreign measures taken by a for-
eign state or foreign tribunal that infringe upon Canada's sovereignty. Section 5 of
FEMA is broadly drafted so as to enable the government to deal with any measures
affecting international trade or commerce that adversely affect or are likely to ad-
versely affect significant Canadian interests in this area, or otherwise infringe or
are likely to infringe upon Canadian sovereignty. Under the authority of section 5
of FEMA, the Attorney General and the Minister may require any person in Canada
to give notice to the Attorney General of "any directives, instructions, intimations
of policy or other communications relating to such measures from a person who
is in a position to direct or influence the policies of the person in Canada." Thus,
the Canadian Government may issue an order that directives issued by the foreign
parent of a Canadian subsidiary, directing the Canadian subsidiary to abide by U.S.
law concerning Cuba, are notifiable. 9
Secondly, section 5 permits the Attorney General and the Minister to prohibit
any person in Canada from complying with foreign measures adversely affecting
Canadian international trade interests, or with any directives relating to such
measures issued by persons in a position to direct or influence the policies of
the Canadian person. Thus, the Canadian Government may order a Canadian
corporation (whether Canadian or foreign-owned) not to comply with the U.S.
embargo against Cuba. Details of the FEMA Order incorporating the notification
and noncompliance obligations are explored below.
4. Penalties for Violating Canadian Blocking Law
Section 7 of FEMA permits the government to prosecute violations of an order
issued under FEMA either by indictment or by summary conviction. Moreover,
contraventions of an order prohibiting production of records and giving of evi-
19. The United States historically takes the view that its sanctions legislation may apply not only
to corporations incorporated in the United States, but also to corporations incorporated elsewhere
that are controlled by U.S. corporations.
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dence in Helms-Burton litigation, or of an order requiring notification of a Cuba
directive or noncompliance with the U.S. embargo, may be prosecuted even if
the offence was committed outside Canada. This provision appears designed to
remove any defense based on extraterritorial application of Canadian criminal
law against a Canadian person or corporation committing an offense outside
Canada in an attempt to evade the application of Canadian law.
Until the 1996 amendments, the maximum fine under the indictment procedure
was Cdn. $10,000, with an additional or alternative maximum imprisonment pen-
alty of five years. The fine on indictment is now Cdn. $1,500,000 for a corporation
and Cdn. $150,000 for an individual. The maximum fine on summary conviction
was Cdn. $5,000, with an additional or alternative maximum imprisonment penalty
of two years. The fine on summary conviction is now Cdn. $150,000 for a corpora-
tion and Cdn. $15,000 for an individual. With a generous allowance for fluctuations
in the exchange rate, the increased fines are intended to match the US$1 million
penalty under the U.S. embargo legislation.
A prosecution may be instituted only with the consent of the Attorney General.
This provision is likely intended to prevent local law enforcement officials from
prosecuting such offenses until the foreign policy implications are considered at
the highest federal level.
Section 7 of FEMA allows the court to take certain circumstances into account
in sentencing. The circumstances listed are nonexclusive and include:
* the degree of premeditation;
* the size, scale, and nature of the offender's operations; and
* whether any economic benefits occurred to the offender.
These factors suggest that a small corporation that was not aware of its Canadian
obligations and that did not profit from its activities is unlikely to receive a heavy
fine. In such circumstances, a prosecution likely would occur, if at all, under
the summary conviction procedure with its much lower maximum fines. In light
of the potential negative political fallout in Canada-in which the corporation
could be viewed as an innocent victim of conflicting foreign policies-such a
corporation probably would not even be prosecuted.
Conversely, a large corporation (perhaps a subsidiary of a U.S. parent) with
a significant Canadian presence that consciously elects to violate Canadian law
might as a legal matter be at risk of prosecution and a higher fine under the
indictment procedure. However, once again the potential political fallout of prose-
cuting an otherwise good corporate citizen would be carefully gauged beforehand
by the Canadian Government. In light of the danger of escalating U.S.-Canada
tensions over Cuba, the Attorney General might decide not to prosecute. Which
situations, then, might lead to prosecution? This issue is discussed in more detail
below, in the context of some specific examples.2 °
20. A Canadian Bar Association delegation in which the author participated was told by
officials from the Departments of Justice and Foreign Affairs at a meeting held in Ottawa on
November 20, 1996 (CBA Meeting), that an exemption concept was considered, but rejected.
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5. Helms-Burton Judgments Unenforceable
Section 7.1 of FEMA specifically states that judgments rendered by U.S. courts
in Title III claims cannot be recognized or enforced in Canada. Previously, section
8 of FEMA only permitted the Attorney General to block the recognition and
enforcement of antitrust law judgments, or to reduce them to an amount as speci-
fied in the order. Section 8(1.1) now allows the Attorney General to block judg-
ments and treble damages awards under foreign trade laws.2 ' This power is
superfluous in relation to Helms-Burton judgments by virtue of section 7.1.
A court asked to recognize and to enforce a Helms-Burton judgment might
have been able to decline the request even in the absence of the blocking provisions
of FEMA. A court might otherwise decline to recognize and to enforce a Title
III judgment on traditional grounds, on the basis it violates Canadian public
policy, it is based on a law of a political nature, or as a treble damages award
it is a penalty judgment.22
6. "Claw-back" Mechanism Blunting Enforcement of Helms-Burton
Judgments
Modelled after the PTIA, FEMA contains a broad "claw-back" provision
that was formerly available only in respect of an antitrust judgment. Under
section 8.1, a Canadian citizen or resident, or a corporation incorporated in
Canada or a person carrying on business in Canada, 3 may apply to the Attorney
General for an order in connection with a judgment given under Title III. The
Attorney General may declare that the Canadian defendant may recover, under
the procedure in section 9, any amount obtained under the judgment, together
with expenses and loss or damage suffered. Conceivably, by including ex-
penses, losses, and damages, the clawed-back amount could exceed the amount
The only flexibility in the Canadian countermeasures is in discretion to prosecute and in the
mitigating circumstances that may be taken into account by a court in sentencing under section
7 of FEMA.
21, There may be some question as to the constitutional validity of section 8 of FEMA because it
could be viewed as intruding upon a provincial responsibility under the Constitution, i.e., property and
civil rights in the province. However, it is possible that a recent resurgence of the federal trade and
commerce power and judicial appreciation for consistency in enforcement ofjudgments across Canada
might have enhanced the constitutional validity of section 8 since it was enacted. See General Motors
v. City National Leasing, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641 (private right of action in the Combines Investigation
Act held constitutional) and Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, [19901 S.C.R. 1077.
22. See J-G. CASTEL, CANADIAN CONFLICT OF LAWS (3d ed., 1994) at 163, 271, 275 for a
discussion of the grounds upon which judgments may not be enforced. Section 8(4) of FEMA states
that a court cannot draw an inference from the fact the Attorney General has not made an order
under section 8(1. 1). Otherwise, it might have been inferred that the absence of an order implies
that the judgment is acceptable to the Canadian Government.
23. Canadian subsidiaries of U.S. parent corporations and U.S. persons carrying on business
in Canada in unincorporated form may avail themselves of the Canadian blocking law. The blocking
protection of FEMA may be attractive to corporations incorporated outside Canada that are engaged
in Cuban trade. Such corporations may wish to restructure their operations and, among other things,
consider incorporating in Canada.
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of the Helms-Burton judgment itself. For example, damages resulting from
consequential loss may be available.
Under section 9(1) of FEMA, the Canadian defendant may sue the U.S. Helms-
Burton plaintiff in Canada and recover from the plaintiff the amount obtained
from the Canadian defendant under the U.S. judgment or the punitive element
of the damage award (i.e., the damages in excess of single damages), together
with the expense of defending the U.S. proceedings and instituting the Canadian
proceedings and any losses or damages suffered by reason of the enforcement
of the U.S. judgment. Thus, the Canadian defendant may claw-back the judgment
obtained in the United States against the Canadian defendant. Under section
9(1.1), even if no final judgment is given under the U.S. proceedings against
the Canadian defendant, the Canadian defendant (with the consent of the Attorney
General) may at any time during the U.S. proceedings sue the U.S. plaintiff and
recover the expense of defending the proceedings.
Of course, given the U.S. public policy articulated in Helms-Burton, it is
questionable whether the Canadian defendant would be able to enforce a Canadian
claw-back judgment through the U.S. courts. The Canadian defendant likely
would have to content itself with enforcing its judgment against the Canadian
assets of the U.S. plaintiff.
Sections 9(1) and 9(1.1) are backed up by an enforcement provision in section
9(2). This provision allows the Canadian court awarding the claw-back damages
to order the seizure and sale of any property in which the foreign plaintiff or
persons controlling it have a direct or indirect beneficial interest. The property
that may be seized and sold includes the shares of any Canadian corporation in
which the foreign plaintiff holds a beneficial interest, even if the share certificates
are located outside Canada. While this provision might itself be considered extra-
territorial, its presence might deter even further a Helms-Burton plaintiff from
pursuing enforcement of its award in Canada.
The claw-back provisions of FEMA are most likely to deter U.S. plaintiffs
with significant Canadian assets, such as a subsidiary operation. They are unlikely
to deter U.S. plaintiffs with few or no assets or business interests in Canada. In
addition, the claw-back provisions of FEMA do not insulate the U.S. or other
foreign assets of Canadian defendants from seizure by a Helms-Burton plaintiff.
III. The FEMA Orders
A. 1990 FEMA ORDER
The first FEMA order was issued on October 31, 1990, in anticipation of the
enactment of the Mack Amendment.2 4 The Mack Amendment would have
amended the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR) so that, in effect, all
24. FoREIGN EXTRATERRITORIAL MEASURES (UNITED STATES) ORDER, (1990) SOR/90-751, Oct.
31, 1990 (the 1990 FEMA Order).
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trade with Cuba originating in Canada by any company that was U.S.-owned or
controlled would be prohibited. The Mack Amendment ultimately did not pass.
However, the 1990 FEMA Order was not revoked until October 1992, when it
was superseded by a new FEMA order.25
B. 1992 FEMA ORDER
The 1992 FEMA Order was passed in response to the amendments to the
CACR effected by the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992.26 The Cuban Democracy
Act accomplished the result intended by the Mack Amendment by prohibiting
U.S. export control officials from issuing any licenses for trade between Cuba
and foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations (except in respect of medicines and
medical supplies). As a result, trade between Cuba and foreign subsidiaries of
U.S. corporations was prohibited by U.S. law.
In response, the 1992 FEMA Order required Canadian corporations and their
officers to give notice to the Attorney General concerning any directives which
they received regarding trade or commerce between Canada and Cuba relating
to an "extraterritorial measure of the United States" from a person in a position
to direct or to influence the policy of the corporation in Canada. "Extraterritorial
measure of the United States" was defined narrowly to refer only to a particular
provision of the Cuban Democracy Act. In addition, Canadian corporations were
prohibited from complying with an extraterritorial measure of the United States,
as defined, and with any directives relating to it.
In effect, the 1992 FEMA Order required Canadian subsidiaries of U.S.-owned
or controlled corporations to continue to trade with Cuba as if the licensing
regime that was revoked by U.S. legislation had not been revoked. There were
no prosecutions for violations of the 1992 FEMA Order, although a number of
cases apparently were investigated.27 The failure to prosecute may have been
due to the limited coverage of the 1992 FEMA Order, prosecutorial restraint in
view of the delicate foreign policy consequences, or simply a lack of evidence.
C. 1996 FEMA ORDER
Anticipating the possible enactment of Helms-Burton, on January 15, 1996,
the 1992 FEMA Order was amended significantly to broaden its scope to blunt
the impact of not only the amendments to U.S. law effected by the Cuban Democ-
racy Act of 1992, but also the provisions of the CACR generally, as well as any
25. FOREIGN EXTRATERRITORIAL MEASURES (UNITED STATES) ORDER, (1992) SOR/92-584, Oct.
9, 1992 (the 1992 FEMA Order).
26. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-484, 106 Stat.
2315 (1992). The Act was signed into law by President Bush in the late stages of an election campaign
in which the vote of the Cuban expatriate population in Florida was crucial.
27. William MacEachem, Ottawa Targets Cuba Policy, THE FINANCIAL POST, Jan. 23, 1996,
at 1.
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similar measure passed by any branch or body of U.S. federal, state, or local
governments.
As the 1992 FEMA Order arguably did not cover nontangible forms of trade,
the amendments cover measures relating to trade in services and technology, as
well as goods. In addition, the FEMA Order introduces a definition of "trade
or commerce between Canada and Cuba" that includes Canadian nationals or
corporations that were black-listed as Cuban nationals or corporations by the
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the U.S. Treasury Department. As
a result, a Canadian corporation discontinuing trade with a Canadian corporation
associated with Sherritt because that associated corporation was black-listed by
the U.S. Treasury Department might violate the FEMA Order.28
The FEMA Order broadens the notification obligation to expand the group of
persons responsible for notifying and to require notification to be made forthwith
and to contain prescribed information.
The FEMA Order broadens the prohibition against complying with an extrater-
ritorial measure of the United States. It requires not only the Canadian corpora-
tion, but also its directors, officers, managers, and employees in a position of
authority not to comply with the U.S. measure. Most significantly, section 6 of the
FEMA Order states that the prohibition against complying with an extraterritorial
measure of the United States or with any directive to do so applies "in respect
of any act or omission constituting compliance." The prohibition applies
"whether or not compliance with the extraterritorial measure or communication
is the only purpose of the act or omission." This language is designed to capture
situations, which apparently arose under the 1992 FEMA Order, in which a
corporation might be able to invoke several other reasons, in addition to its
concern for the U.S. Cuban embargo, for ceasing trade with Cuba. The problem
of mixed motives is discussed in detail below.
The FEMA Order places Canadian corporations and their directors and man-
agement in a dilemma in relation to compliance with Canadian and U.S. law.
28. The following entities associated with Sherritt Inc., a predecessor corporation of Sherritt,
were added in June 1995 to the list of Specially Designated Nationals on the basis they are owned
or controlled by or act or purport to act directly or indirectly on behalf of the Cuban Government
and are therefore subject to the prohibitions of the CACR: The Cobalt Refinery Company Inc. (an
Alberta corporation); International Cobalt Company Inc. (a Bahamas corporation); La Compania
General de Niquel S.A. (also known as General Nickel Company S.A., a Cuban state company,
GNC); and Moa Nickel S.A. (also a Cuban state company). Changes to the List of Specially Designated
Nationals of Cuba, 60 Fed. Reg. 33029 (1995). At the time of writing, Sherritt itself was not listed
as a Specially Designated National. In late 1995, partly out of concern for the bill that became the
Helms-Burton law, Sherritt Inc. reorganized by splitting into Sherritt, a publicly traded New Bruns-
wick corporation that assumed Sherritt's Cuban nickel business, and Sherritt Inc. (since April 1996
known as Viridian Inc.), which assumed its fertilizer business. Sherritt owns a 50% interest in the
Specially Designated Nationals listed above, with the exception of GNC. GNC owns the remaining
50% interest. See Sherritt Rights Offering Prospectus dated November 20, 1995. Viridian was
acquired by Agrium Inc., another fertilizer company, on December 10, 1996. See Agrium Inc. News
Release dated December 10, 1996.
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The Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement accompanying the FEMA Order rec-
ognizes that
the amendments will place some corporations and persons in Canada in a situation in
which they cannot comply with United States law and other measures. This will, how-
ever, be due to the extraterritorial imposition of United States law and other measures
on Canadian trade with Cuba in violation of Canadian sovereignty and in violation of
generally accepted principles of international law. Should a person be prosecuted in
the United States for a violation of a United States measure, the existence of this order
may be considered by American courts.29
Its precise impact, however, will be for those courts to determine.
No guidelines or interpretation bulletins have been published concerning the
FEMA Order, and it is unlikely any will be made available.3° The news release
issued with the FEMA Order simply states the 1992 FEMA Order was amended
"to block attempts by the United States to restrict trade between Cuba and U.S.-
owned subsidiaries based in Canada." 3 Corporations wishing to understand their
obligations under the FEMA Order therefore are forced to undertake a very close
reading of the FEMA Order and to consult legal counsel.
The following sections of this article examine in detail the notification and
noncompliance obligations in the FEMA Order.
D. NOTIFICATION OBLIGATION
1. Types of Notifiable Communications
The notification obligation in the FEMA Order now extends to directors of
Canadian corporations and requires Canadian corporations and their directors
and officers forthwith to give notice to the Attorney General regarding any policies
or communications they receive relating to an extraterritorial measure of the
United States. The 1992 FEMA Order did not require notification to be made
on an urgent basis. The FEMA Order specifies the content of the notice to be
sent to the Attorney General, including the names of the persons from whom
the communication originated and by whom the communication was received,
the text of the communication, the date the communication was received, and
the period during which the communication is intended to be effective.
The type of communication that must be notified is described as "any directive,
instruction, intimation of policy or other communication ... ," echoing the
29. This statement is an allusion to the possible availability of the foreign sovereign compulsion
defense in a prosecution of a Canadian corporation in a U.S. court for alleged noncompliance with
the CACR. If there is a true conflict between U.S. and foreign law, U.S. courts may decline to
exercise jurisdiction. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993).
30. At the CBA Meeting, the delegation was informed that the government does not intend to
provide for advisory opinions or to issue guidelines.
31. "Canada Amends Order Blocking U.S. Trade Restrictions," Government of Canada News
Release No. 8, January 18, 1996.
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wording in FEMA itself. While the nature of a "directive" or "instruction" is
relatively clear in most cases, the meanings of "intimation of policy" and "other
communication" are perhaps less clear. "Intimation of policy" seems designed
to capture a communication that does not take the form of a directive or instruction,
but essentially amounts to the same thing because it is corporate "policy" and
as such must be adhered to. "Other communication" is potentially very expan-
sive. On its face, this phrase could potentially even cover communications subject
to legal protection, such as solicitor-client communications,32 or communications
that take the form merely of information, e.g., the transmittal of the text of the
CACR and no more.
Some reasonable limits should be placed on the types of communications subject
to notification. It is a well-accepted principle of statutory construction that in
any phrase grouping various concepts together, a general closing word or catch-all
concept should be interpreted consistently with the more specific elements of
that grouping. Adopting this principle, it seems reasonable to interpret "other
communication" in the FEMA Order as a communication that takes its meaning
from the previous terms (directive, instruction, intimation of policy). A communi-
cation that is instructional in nature is therefore notifiable.
Mere information concerning an extraterritorial measure of the United States
should be insufficient to trigger the notification obligation. However, the particu-
lar circumstances of the situation should be reviewed. The transmission of mere
information might also amount to an "intimation of policy." For example, con-
sider a communication consisting of the text or substance of U.S. law regarding
Cuba accompanied by an observation that U.S. law purports to extend to U.S.-
owned or controlled subsidiaries abroad and that U.S. persons may be liable to
prosecution for a violation by the subsidiary. The relationship between the U.S.
parent corporation and its subsidiary in Canada may be such that this communica-
tion might well be construed as an intimation of policy not to engage in trading
activities with Cuba.
It is important to note that a directive does not need to have been implemented
in order to be notifiable. Also, a countermand directive by the Canadian corpora-
tion does not negate the notifiable character of the directive.
Standard export instructions and general codes of conduct to which not much
thought were given previously now raise questions concerning their notifiability.
For example, a code of conduct dealing with various aspects of international
business, including foreign corrupt practices and foreign antitrust laws, might
32. See Richard G. Dearden, Trade with Cuba-Canada and the United States Set on a Collision
Course, 1996 A.B.A., Sec. of Int'l Law & Practice 8. At the CBA Meeting, a Department of Justice
official with principal responsibility for the FEMA Order commented that his personal view was
that true solicitor-client communications should not be caught by the notification obligation. However,
he pointed out the potential for abuse in this area; e.g., routing directives that on their face are
notifiable through in-house legal departments.
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also incidentally mention U.S. embargo legislation extending to a number of
countries, including Cuba.
A corporate code applicable to international operations may be redrafted so
that the revised version is not notifiable. For example, instructions regarding
Cuba could be amended to make clear that prohibitions on trading with Cuba
are subject to local law, and that foreign subsidiaries, branches, and other foreign
affiliates or overseas business units should consult with local legal counsel to
determine the requirements of local law.
2. Circumstances Creating Notifiable Communications
Although the notification provisions of the FEMA Order may have been de-
signed to catch communications issued by the U.S. parents of Canadian subsidiar-
ies, Canadian corporations that are not U.S.-controlled also must be sensitive
to the notification provision. For example, a president of a Canadian-controlled
corporation is "a person who is in a position to direct or influence the policies
of the Canadian corporation in Canada" as described in section 3 of the FEMA
Order. If the president issues a memorandum to employees stating that the corpo-
ration will not trade with Cuba to safeguard its competitive standing in tendering
for government contracts in the United States, the corporation and its directors
and other officers seem to be obligated to provide a notice to the Attorney General
concerning the memorandum issued by the president.33
The notification obligation arguably only applies when the corporation and its
directors and officers are aware of the terms of a notifiable communication. It
seems there should be no affirmative duty for the corporation to undertake an
extensive, time-consuming, and expensive search of its files to unearth any poten-
tially notifiable communications, particularly if the corporation pursues Cuban
business opportunities as it would any other opportunities. A related case arises
when a directive is received by a low-level employee and not communicated to
the corporation's directors and officers. Arguably, this communication is not
caught by the notification obligation.34 Are communications that predate the
FEMA Order notifiable? They probably are, to the extent that they have a continu-
ing influence over the affairs of the corporation.35
33. They also seem to be obliged to disregard the president's memorandum by virtue of the
noncompliance obligation, discussed below.
34. There is a distinction made in the notification obligation in section 3 of the FEMA Order
and in the noncompliance obligation in section 5 of the FEMA Order between the categories of
persons who have responsibility for abiding by the obligation. The notification obligation is restricted
to directors and officers, while the noncompliance obligation includes not only directors and officers,
but also managers and employees in a position of authority.
35. Although there is a presumption that legislation is not intended to have a retroactive applica-
tion, there is no presumption against the immediate and general application of legislation; quite the
reverse is presumed. The obligation to notify does not reach into the past and alter the law or the
rights of persons as of an earlier date; rather, the application is prospective only to the facts in the
present time; see Gustavson Drilling, [1977] 1 S.C.R. 271; Attorney Gen. of Quebec v. Expropriation
Tribunal, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 732: and Chebaro v. Chebaro, [1987] Fam. 127 (Eng. C.A.). Section
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3. Consequences of Filing a Notification
Failure to notify a notifiable communication is a criminal offense. However,
there is no criminal penalty associated with either having received a notifiable
communication or having submitted a notification. Nevertheless, the filing of
a notification with the Attorney General constitutes direct evidence about the
communication and could possibly create an inference (if it is not rebutted in
the notification itself) that the communication was complied with. For example,
if there was a previous complaint to the Department of Justice concerning compli-
ance with the CACR by the notifying corporation, the Justice Department could
recommend an investigation to determine whether the corporation is in violation
of the noncompliance obligation of the FEMA Order.
A senior Department of Justice lawyer assured the author that notifications
made to the Attorney General are treated with extreme confidence. The official,
who is closely involved with the administration of the FEMA Order, indicated
that notifications are not released pursuant to an Access to Information Act
36
request and are not transmitted to other government departments (e. g., the Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs and International Trade) for use in Canada's diplomatic
efforts against Helms-Burton. Of course, a notification may become public if
the Attorney General prosecutes a violation of the FEMA Order.
4. Strategic Considerations
If it is determined that a communication is notifiable, it is important to comply
with the notification obligation as soon as possible, i.e., forthwith, as set out in
the legislation. Notifications may include supplementary information setting out
the circumstances in which the notification was received. This is particularly
important if:
" the communication was received some time ago;
* the communication was sent inadvertently;
* similar future communications will be amended to exclude Canada; or
" the Canadian corporation has not complied with the communication.
3(1) of the FEMA Order refers to communications "that the Canadian corporation, director or officer
has received from a person .... "The legislation could more clearly restrict the notification obligation
only to present and future receipt of communications if the word "receives" were used instead.
36. The Federal Access to Information Act, R.S.C. ch. A-I (1985) (AIA) provides that any
record containing information the disclosure of which is restricted by a statutory provision set out
in Schedule II of the AIA cannot be disclosed. However, the notification requirements of section 5
of FEMA are not scheduled. FEMA would have to be amended to allow the notification provision
in section 5 to be included in Schedule II to the AIA. There may be other grounds upon which
the Department of Justice could deny access to notifications, such as the exceptions for Canada's
international affairs in section 15 and third-party information in section 20. A close reading of these
exceptions and the content of a typical notification suggests there is some scope for argument on
the relevancy of these exceptions. Canadian subsidiaries of U.S. firms should also be sensitive to
Cuba-related documents, other than notifications, that may reside in government files. Subject to
the statutory exceptions, these may be released in response to an AIA request.
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The notification obligation is self-enforced. The FEMA Order does not require
Canadian corporations to certify on a regular basis that they received no directives
over a specific period of time. Thus, it might be tempting not to notify the Attorney
General of a communication that should be notified, so as to avoid possible
investigation. The better strategy is to comply with the law and to explain the
circumstances of the receipt of the communication. The risk in not notifying is
that the government might otherwise learn of the existence of the communication
and, depending on the facts, perhaps take a much less sanguine view of the failure
to notify.
For example, a Canadian buying agent acting on behalf of a Cuban state entity
might complain to the Department of Justice that it was unable to obtain supplies
of a product from a U.S.-controlled Canadian subsidiary. In the course of investi-
gating the matter, the Canadian authorities could search the subsidiary's premises
and discover a notifiable communication. It can be expected that, in any criminal
proceedings that might follow, the failure to notify will be one of the charges
prosecuted. This fact may well make it more difficult to defend against a charge
of complying with a U.S. extraterritorial measure.
As a practical matter, in order to avoid a notifiable communication arising in
transborder discussions about the respective compliance obligations of the U.S.
and Canadian corporations, it is desirable to involve outside U.S. and Canadian
counsel as intermediaries. The discussions could be managed so that they are
privileged and undertaken for the purpose of obtaining legal advice.
In some circumstances, the U.S. parent may be anxious to issue a directive
to the Canadian subsidiary, knowing that this directive creates a notification
obligation on the part of the Canadian subsidiary. This might occur when the
U.S. parent is under investigation by OFAC for failing to control the Cuban
business activities of its foreign subsidiaries. The fact of the notification is used
by the U.S. parent as evidence of compliance with U.S. law. In this situation,
Canadian counsel for the Canadian subsidiary has to tread carefully to ensure
that the Canadian subsidiary is fully conversant with Canadian law and that
counsel's professional duty to the Canadian client is served. At the same time,
U.S. and Canadian counsel should strive for an overall positive outcome for both
the U.S. and the Canadian corporations, consistent with the two sets of laws.
B. NONCOMPLIANCE OBLIGATION
1. Noncompliance Obligation Contrasted with Notification Obligation
Section 5 of the FEMA Order prohibits compliance with extraterritorial mea-
sures of the United States, as defined, or with any directive relating to such
a measure. As noted above, the noncompliance obligation is broader than the
notification obligation in at least two ways.
First, the persons obliged to take section 5 into account include managers and
employees in authority, in addition to directors and officers of the Canadian
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corporation. All four categories of individuals are prohibited by section 5 from
complying with a notifiable communication, while only directors and officers
are obliged to notify under section 3 of the FEMA Order. Thus, it is important
to bear in mind that managers and employees in a position of authority who
receive a notifiable communication cannot act upon the communication even if
technically they do not seem to be obliged to notify it under section 3. Second, the
noncompliance obligation applies even if there was no notifiable communication.
2. Extended Definition of Compliance
Most controversially, section 6 of the FEMA Order prohibits compliance with
an extraterritorial measure of the United States when compliance with such mea-
sure is but one consideration among several in a corporation's decision not to
engage in Cuban business. Section 6 reads as follows:
Section 5 applies in respect of any act or omission constituting compliance, in respect
of any trade or commerce between Canada and Cuba, with an extraterritorial measure
of the United States or a communication referred to in that section, whether or not
compliance with that measure or communication is the only purpose of the act or
omission.
For example, a Canadian corporation might be tempted to decline some Cuban
business because it is encountering difficulty in establishing the Cuban customer's
creditworthiness and believes it may encounter some difficulties servicing equip-
ment that is the subject of the business proposal. At the same time, because the
Canadian corporation is a subsidiary of a U.S. corporation, the corporation factors
into its thinking the restrictions on trading with Cuba set out in the CACR.
Although all of these factors enter into the decision by the Canadian corporation
not to pursue the proposal, section 6 of the FEMA Order in effect downgrades
the importance of the other factors and seems to ascribe criminal liability to the
Canadian corporation for compliance with U.S. embargo law.
The limits of the compliance obligation are difficult to define. Does a corpora-
tion really comply with U.S. law if it can demonstrate there are several objective,
obvious, and reasonable business reasons for not pursuing a Cuban business
opportunity or relationship, and concern for the U.S. embargo law is merely
incidental? Taken to an extreme level, does the noncompliance obligation apply
to all Canadian subsidiaries of U.S. corporations that, because of the CACR,
have never developed business opportunities they know exist in Cuba? Section
6 seems to go too far in implying that Canadian corporations are almost under
a legal duty to trade with Cuba under any circumstances.
The definition of "trade or commerce between Canada and Cuba" in the
FEMA Order raises the question of indirect relationships. This definition refers
to trade between (1) Canada and its nationals, corporations, or other legal entities,
and (2) Cuba or its nationals, corporations, or other legal entities and Canadian
nationals or corporations designated as Cuban nationals or corporations under
extraterritorial U.S. law. For example, does a Canadian corporation's decision
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to terminate a contractual relationship with a third-country (e.g., Mexican) corpo-
ration engaged in trade with Cuba fall within the noncompliance obligation? Is
this too remote a relationship?
3. Definition of "Extraterritorial Measure of the United States"
A threshold and apparently straightforward consideration in complying with
the FEMA Order is knowing what constitutes an "extraterritorial measure of
the United States." While the FEMA Order includes a definition of this phrase,
the definition raises a number of very difficult questions of interpretation, and
therefore questions about the application of the FEMA Order.
The first branch of the definition defines "extraterritorial measure of the United
States" as the CACR. This is specific and readily ascertainable. The second
branch of the definition is expansive and more murky. It refers to any kind of
"legislative, executive, administrative, regulatory, judicial or quasi-judicial"
instrument emanating from the federal, state, or local level "having a purpose
similar to that of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations." The second branch
of the definition covers legislation such as local and state procurement laws that
discriminate against foreign businesses with a Cuban relationship. Because the
FEMA Order pre-dates Helms-Burton by almost two months, the second branch
of the definition does not refer directly to Helms-Burton. Although it may seem
obvious, still the question should be asked: does the second branch of the definition
capture Helms-Burton?
To answer this question, a Canadian corporation is forced to undertake a
rather strange exercise involving the interpretation of foreign laws. It must first
determine the purpose of the CACR. Assuming the Canadian corporation con-
cludes that the purpose of these regulations is to create a comprehensive sanctions
system regarding Cuba, it then needs to determine whether the second branch
of the definition captures Helms-Burton. To do this, the Canadian corporation
must understand the purpose of the Helms-Burton law. 37 The Canadian corpora-
tion must then compare the purposes of Helms-Burton and the CACR and deter-
mine whether the purpose set out in Helms-Burton is similar to that of the CACR.
Assuming the Canadian corporation determines that the purposes of the CACR
and Helms-Burton are similar, the Canadian corporation must then determine
whether it is complying with the CACR or the Helms-Burton law. Consider the
situation of a Canadian-controlled corporation that declines a Cuban opportunity
37. Section 3 of the Helms-Burton law sets out six purposes, including: assisting the Cuban
people in regaining their freedom and prosperity; strengthening international sanctions against the
Castro government; providing for the continued national security of the United States; encouraging
the holding of free and fair democratic elections in Cuba; providing a policy framework for U.S.
support to the Cuban people in response to the formation of a transition government or a democratically
elected government in Cuba; and protecting U.S. nationals against confiscatory takings and the
wrongful trafficking in property confiscated by the Castro regime.
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because it fears that pursuit of the opportunity might expose its U.S. subsidiary's
assets to a lawsuit under Title III of the Helms-Burton law. Does failure to pursue
the Cuban opportunity constitute compliance with Helms-Burton? Some observers
might argue this behavior constitutes compliance since it results in the denial of
economic benefits to the Castro regime and achieves the same purpose as the
CACR. Others might argue, on a more narrow reading of the FEMA Order,
that it is difficult to characterize such behavior as compliance because taking
that decision does not bring the Canadian corporation into conformity with any
positive obligations established under Title III of Helms-Burton.
Do the recent amendments to FEMA assist in resolving this problem? Although
the government scheduled Helms-Burton as a "foreign trade law" that is "con-
trary to international law or international comity," this fact does not directly
answer the question as to whether Helms-Burton has a purpose similar to that
of the CACR. Indeed, the fact Helms-Burton is so scheduled might suggest the
government decided to address concerns regarding Helms-Burton under FEMA
rather than the FEMA Order. Two points may be made in this regard. First,
although FEMA was amended to deal with Helms-Burton, the government has
not amended the FEMA Order to specifically refer to Helms-Burton. Second,
the government did not schedule the CACR as an objectionable foreign trade
law when it amended FEMA.
One may also resort to general principles of statutory interpretation in under-
standing the noncompliance obligation under the FEMA Order. On the one hand,
there is the general principle that criminal legislation is strictly interpreted in
favor of the accused and any doubt or ambiguity is resolved in favor of the
accused.38 On the other hand, the federal Interpretation Act requires the court
to give all laws of Canada, including criminal laws, a "fair, large and liberal
construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects." 39
Is it appropriate to give Canadian corporations the benefit of the doubt on this
question? Or should Canadian foreign policy prevail?
The interpretation issues suggest that the FEMA Order may be vulnerable on
constitutional grounds. The troublesome areas are the vagueness of the second
branch of the definition of "extraterritorial measure of the United States" and
the expansive reach of section 6 in capturing any acts or omissions, no matter
how minor.
Some comfort on these issues might be drawn from some statements made at
the CBA Meeting. A Foreign Affairs official indicated during the meeting that
there is currently no political will to clear up any ambiguity in the FEMA Order.
If ambiguity were to become an issue, the official indicated the order might very
38. See Marcotte v. Canada (Deputy A.G.), [1976] 1 S.C.R. 108, 115; R. v. McLaughlin,
[1980] 2 S.C.R. 331, 335.
39. Interpretation Act, R.S.C. ch. 1-21, sec. 12 (1985).
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well be amended so that Helms-Burton is clearly defined as an "extraterritorial
measure of the United States." It was explained that exempting Helms-Burton
from the coverage of the FEMA Order, despite the practical problems alluded
to above, would not be politically attractive to the government. This view suggests
it may be appropriate at the present time to construe the current ambiguity in
favor of the Canadian corporation.
4. Enforcement of the FEMA Order
At the time of writing, the Canadian Government had not prosecuted any
Canadian corporation for a violation of the FEMA Order. However, one case
in particular was the subject of official comment. In March 1997 it was reported
that Wal-Mart Canada removed Cuban-made pajamas from its Canadian store
shelves until it obtained a legal opinion on whether its U.S. parent company
might be in violation of the CACR.40 As a result of the decision, Canada's Interna-
tional Trade Minister, Art Eggleton, announced the Department of Justice was
studying whether Wal-Mart Canada's decision violated the FEMA Order.4'
Shortly afterwards, the U.S. Treasury Department announced it was reviewing
Wal-Mart Canada's decision to restock the Cuban-made pajamas at its Canadian
stores.42
The Wal-Mart case demonstrates the intergovernmental tensions that can arise
when the Canadian subsidiary of a U.S. corporation encounters the conflicting
requirements of U.S. and Canadian law. If the case does not result in a prosecution
on either side of the border, such lack of prosecution will be a tacit recognition
of the diplomatic problems associated with enforcing the CACR and the FEMA
Order in such circumstances.
5. Canadian Controls on Exports of U.S. -Origin Goods to Cuba
The Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement accompanying the FEMA Order
explains that the order did not revoke or diminish Canadian controls on the export
of U.S. -origin goods to Cuba. In effect, compliance with Canadian export control
law regarding Cuba does not constitute compliance with U.S. law regarding Cuba
contrary to FEMA. The two systems co-exist.
There is a long history of economic cooperation between Canada and the United
States on export controls. This history dates back to World War II and pre-dates
40. David Roberts, Wal-Mart Pulls Cuban Pajamas from Stores, THE GLOBE & MAIL, Mar.
1, 1997. The article reports that Canadian customers brought to the attention of Wal-Mart Canada
the apparent inconsistency of the Canadian company selling the pajamas when the U.S. company
could not.
41. Canada Studying Wal-Mart Actions for Anti-Helms-Burton Law Violations, 14 INT'L TRADE
REP. No. 11, 481 (1997).
42. See Treasury Reviewing Wal-Mart Canada Decision to Sell Cuban-Made Pajamas, 14 INT'L
TRADE REP. No. 12, 522 (1997). The re-stocking decision seems to have been motivated by Wal-Mart
Canada's desire to comply with the FEMA Order rather than the CACR.
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the Cuban revolution. Item 5400 of Canada's Export Control List established
under the Export and Import Permits Act4 3 implements Canada's obligations to the
United States for U.S.-origin goods. In exchange for U.S.-origin goods entering
Canada without the necessity of a U.S. export license, the export of U.S.-origin
goods requires a Canadian export permit. There is an exception in Item 5400
for "goods that have been further processed or manufactured outside the United
States so as to result in a substantial change of value, form or use of the goods
or in the production of new goods." Item 5400 therefore ensures that U.S. -origin
goods are subject to Canadian export permit requirements.
For ease of administration, General Export Permit (GEP) No. Ex 12-United
States Origin Goods (GEP 12) 44 permits goods that are not otherwise controlled
by the Export Control List to be exported without the necessity of obtaining an
individual export permit. However, GEP 12 does not authorize the exportation
of goods to Cuba. As a result, it is necessary to apply for an individual export
permit to export any U.S.-origin goods from Canada to Cuba.
Canadian export control officials question the proposed export to Cuba of
goods or major components marked "Made in U.S.A.." Generally, marks of
origin, such as "Made in Canada," are accepted for export control purposes,
even though the U.S.-origin content of the goods may exceed the U.S. content
thresholds.
In the case of goods manufactured in Canada or outside Canada and the United
States, which incorporate U.S.-origin materials in the manufacturing process,
Canadian export control officials judge, according to the test in Item 5400, the
extent to which the U.S.-origin materials were substantially changed "in value,
form or use . . . in the production of new goods." If the percentage of U.S.
content remains substantial, i.e., at least 50 percent of the value of the goods,
the goods generally are treated as being of U.S. origin. 45 The Canadian threshold
for U. S. -origin content is higher than the U.S. threshold and may cause difficulties
in complying with both systems.
Prior to the amendment of the CACR by the Cuban Democracy Act, U.S.
export control officials determined that if the cost of U.S.-origin content was
not in excess of 20 percent of the export selling price, a license would be issued.
Since the amendments, however, licenses are not issued on this basis. Now,
when the cost of the U.S.-origin goods to the Canadian manufacturer is not in
excess of 10 percent of the export selling price of the end product, a U.S. export
license generally is not required under U.S. export control laws.46
43. Export and Import Permits Act, R.S.C. ch. E-19 (1985).
44. SOR/97-107 (Jan. 29, 1997) ("GEP 12")
45. The 50% figure is an unwritten administrative guideline only, with no statutory or regulatory
force.
46. John Ellicott, "Conflicting Positions of the United States and Canada Regarding Trade with
Cuba and Cuban Parties by Canadian Subsidiaries of U.S. Corporations," paper presented to the
Annual Spring Meeting of the American Bar Association Section of International Law and Practice
held April 24-27, 1996, at 19-20.
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A somewhat inconsistent result occurs in the case of Canadian goods produced
using 100 percent U.S.-origin technology. In this case, the goods consist of
Canadian materials and do not themselves constitute the technology. Such goods
may be eligible for export to Cuba without an individual export permit, unless
they are otherwise listed on the Export Control List. U.S. law may conflict with
Canadian law in this situation. In contrast, if U.S.-origin technology itself was
reduced to a material form, such as a blueprint, it is considered a good and its
export is controlled. The technology in a material form is considered U.S. -origin
goods, and could not be exported to Cuba from Canada.47
The practical effect of the implementation of Item 5400 of the Export Control
List is that a sale to Cuba of U.S.-origin goods (or goods with at least 50 percent
U.S. content) is prohibited both by Canadian and by U.S. law. There is no conflict
between the two legal systems so long as the goods contain at least 50 percent
U.S. content.
In addition to goods within Item 5400, there are goods otherwise controlled
by Canada on the Export Control List (e.g., goods with dual civil/military applica-
tions, munitions, and nuclear goods) that are independently controlled even if
they are not of U.S. origin. As a result, exports of such goods to Cuba are subject
to Canadian export controls that may deny their export.
6. Navigating Between the Cuban Assets Control Regulations
and the FEMA Order
There may be situations when Canadian corporations face the apparently con-
flicting demands of the CACR and the FEMA Order. For example, a Canadian
subsidiary of a U.S. corporation may receive an order from a buying agent for
a Cuban entity. Suppose the goods ordered do not qualify as U.S.-origin goods.
Should the Canadian subsidiary sell the goods? In this context, it may be useful
to consider whether there may be contractual restrictions between the U.S. parent
corporation and its Canadian subsidiary concerning the territories in which the
Canadian subsidiary may sell the non-U.S. origin goods. For example, consider
the case of goods manufactured in Canada by a Canadian subsidiary of a U.S.
parent corporation. By virtue of contractual restrictions and territorial limitations
on intellectual property rights, the goods may be sold by the Canadian subsidiary
only to Canadian customers. In this case, the Canadian subsidiary simply may
not have the right to sell the goods to foreign territories, including Cuba. This
situation may pre-date the FEMA Order and may have been determined com-
pletely independently of any considerations of trade with Cuba. The paramount
consideration may simply have been the territorial integrity of the parent com-
pany's distribution system. In this case, a decision not to sell to Cuba should be
consistent with the legal obligations of the Canadian subsidiary. Refusing to sell
47. Jonathan T. Fried, The Impact of U.S. Export Controls on Trade Between Canada and the
United States, I1 CANADA-UNITED STATES L.J. 185, 191-2 (1986).
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to a Cuban customer in this situation should not be considered a violation of the
FEMA Order.
Another case of apparent conflict may involve consignment goods in Canada
to which the U.S. parent corporation retained title. In this case, the U.S. corpora-
tion may be within its rights, under the applicable law of the consignment
agreement and its relationship with its Canadian subsidiary, to exercise control
over these goods and to deny their purported sale by the Canadian subsidiary to
a Cuban customer. A variation of this situation is a refusal by the U.S. parent
to sell non-U.S.-origin parts to its Canadian subsidiary, which the subsidiary has
ordered for a Cuban customer. In these cases, the Canadian corporation does
not have the right to interfere with its parent's decision. Again, it is difficult to
imagine how the Canadian subsidiary violates the FEMA Order by failing to
complete the sale in these situations.
IV. Navigating Between Title III of Helms-Burton and the FEMA Order
The broad definition of traffic in the Helms-Burton law draws in Canadian
businesses that are not principally involved in dealing with confiscated property
claimed by a U.S. person. For example, suppliers to those who are trafficking
in confiscated property might be considered to be profiting from this relationship.
Customers of traffickers might be considered to be profiting because they are
engaged in sales and distribution of confiscated property. Financial institutions
with security interests in inventories of materials derived from confiscated prop-
erty might be considered to hold an interest in that property. What are the Canadian
legal consequences when these firms desire to extricate themselves from these
relationships in order to minimize their exposure to lawsuits under Title III of
Helms-Burton?
While the Helms-Burton law frowns on these contractual relationships, it does
not speak to their enforceability under the law governing these relationships
(which may not be U.S. law). The alleged trafficker may sue for breach of
contract if its partner purports to terminate the contract. Moreover, ceasing to
do business with the alleged trafficker might expose a Canadian company to
criminal liability under the FEMA Order. How does the Canadian supplier or
customer:
" avoid Helms-Burton liability by extricating itself from the relationship;
* avoid civil liability under its contractual obligations; and
" avoid criminal liability under the FEMA Order?
As a preliminary matter, the Canadian corporation could conduct due diligence
by searching the FCSC records of certified claims and by conducting title searches
in Cuba. It could obtain a U.S. legal opinion to ascertain its risk of being sued
under Title III of Helms-Burton.48 If there is a reasonable basis to conclude the
48. See Marcus, supra note 5.
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corporation is not trafficking, it would be unnecessary for the corporation to
extricate itself from the relationship. Simply conducting due diligence should
not be considered a violation of the FEMA Order. To hold otherwise would
be to compel Canadian corporations to recklessly incur potential Helms-Burton
liabilities. This result cannot be the intent of the FEMA Order.
In terms of civil liability, it seems the most prudent course for a firm desiring
to exit its Cuban relationship is to try to reach some kind of mutually acceptable
termination rather than simply breaching the contract. Apart from minimizing
damages, private settlement of any differences avoids the publicity associated
with a lawsuit that could draw attention to the relationship. Avoidance of publicity
could in turn minimize the chances of the exiting firm becoming known to a
possible plaintiff under Title III. If the proposed extrication is likely to become
known to the Canadian Government, the Canadian corporation may wish to
make submissions to the Department of Justice. The corporation could argue its
proposed course of action will not violate the FEMA Order in the circumstances
presented, and moreover that prosecution under the FEMA Order is not in the
public interest.
This may have been the strategy selected by Redpath Sugar. Redpath reportedly
decided in 1996 not to renew its contract to purchase Cuban sugar, citing its
desire to sell to Canadian industrial sugar users who sell their products to the
United States. Since Cuban sugar cannot enter the United States, these users can
be supplied only with non-Cuban sugar. The company claimed that maintaining
two separate inventories of Cuban and non-Cuban sugar is costly and impractical.
The company also cited the unreliability of Cuban supplies and the competitive-
ness of other sources of sugar.49
Arguments of this nature may be easier to make if the corporation puts in
place an alternative arrangement that will be considered appropriate in light of
the purpose of the FEMA Order. The wording of the FEMA Order suggests that
the Canadian Government's principal concern is the reach of U.S. extraterritorial
measures to Canadian corporations that in turn feel compelled to curtail trade
with Cuba. The definition in the order of "extraterritorial measures of the United
States" includes the qualification "to the extent that they operate or are likely
to operate so as to prevent, impede or reduce trade or commerce between Canada
and Cuba" (emphasis added). If the actions taken by the Canadian corporation
do not have such negative trade effects, and are based upon good business reasons
(including a desire to insulate the Canadian corporation from possible liability
under Title III), then from a policy perspective should restructuring the relation-
ship be permitted? Is careful planning to preserve the corporation's financial and
legal health inconsistent with the FEMA Order?
49. See John Geddes, Redpath 's Baron Cuban Sugar May Break Canadian Law, THE FINANCIAL
POST, May 23, 1996, at 1.
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For example, a supply agreement between a Canadian supplier and a Cuban
customer might be rearranged so that the Canadian supplier with U.S. assets
exposed to a Title III action assigns its supply obligation to another Canadian
corporation that does not have a similar concern about liability under Title III.
If the alternative supplier is acceptable to the Cuban customer, and the terms
and conditions of supply essentially remain unchanged, it would seem no prosecu-
tion is warranted. Canada's policy of continuing trade with Cuba is not frustrated.
However, under a broad interpretation of the noncompliance prohibition, it
could be argued this restructured arrangement runs afoul of the noncompliance
obligation in the FEMA Order. The ambiguity that exists in the FEMA Order
potentially means that Canadian corporations are at risk of being prosecuted under
Canadian law if they take defensive measures to avoid liability under Title III
of Helms-Burton.
This result seems contrary to the Canadian Government's policy of protecting
Canadian corporations from exposure to such lawsuits. By amending FEMA,
by declaring that Title III judgments will not be enforced or recognized in Canada,
and by allowing Canadian corporations to recover claw-back damages in Canadian
courts, the government attempted to provide some protection for Canadian corpo-
rations facing Helms-Burton liabilities. It would be ironic indeed if Canadian law
is interpreted by the Canadian Government so as to prohibit Canadian corporations
from restructuring their Cuban relationships to minimize their exposure to Title
III actions in the first place. A broad view of the FEMA Order also places a
Canadian corporation's board of directors in an impossible position, by forcing
its members to choose between their fiduciary obligations to preserve the corpora-
tion's assets from Title III lawsuits and their obligations to avoid criminal liability
under the FEMA Order.
Certainly, from the perspective of U.S. law, a settlement between an alleged
trafficker and a U.S. national holding a claim to confiscated U.S. property is
an acceptable resolution under both Titles III and IV of Helms-Burton. It was
announced in July 1997 that ITT Corporation informed the Department of State
that it and STET International (STET) (an Italian telecommunications company
now known as Telecom Italia) reached an agreement for ten years regarding
ITT's confiscated property in Cuba consisting of the Cuban Telephone System. 50
As a result of the settlement, the State Department terminated the ongoing investi-
gation relating to STET's use of ITT's confiscated Cuban property, and STET
thus avoided possible exclusion of its executives from the United States under
Title IV. Subsequent reports stated the European Commission had no intention
of recommending prosecution of STET for its apparent compliance with Helms-
50. See U.S. Department of State statement by Nicholas Burns, July 23, 1997. The State Depart-
ment noted that ITT's claim was certified by the FCSC in June 1970 in the amount of US$130
million, plus interest.
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Burton. Yet, the European Union, like Canada, adopted blocking legislation that
prohibits compliance with U.S. extraterritorial law regarding Cuba . 5
V. Conclusion
The extraterritorial impact on Canadian corporations of U.S. laws concerning
trade with Cuba is dissipated to some extent by Canada's blocking legislation.
The Canadian law creates notification and noncompliance obligations that raise
difficult interpretation questions. In certain circumstances, it may be possible to
comply with both U.S. and Canadian law concerning trade with Cuba.
51. EU Clears Cuban Deal Struck by Telecom Italia, THE GLOBE & MAIL, July 25, 1997, at
B-8. Telecom Italia owns a minority interest in the Cuban Telephone Company, ETECSA.
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